1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

645 Ministries; Sasun Ḥasqayl was omitted for the first time. A State visit by the King to Karbalā and Najf in December was an outstanding success. The substitution in March 1924 of the name of King Ḥusayn, newly self-styled Caliph, for that of the Sultan of Turkey in the Khuṭba when the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished, raised the prestige of the royal family, and was accepted with surprising willingness by Sunni and Shi'i alike.

646 The Constituent Assembly was opened with due ceremonial
648* by the King on 27 March 1924. Under the presidency of 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey it proceeded to its first task, ratification of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty and its Protocol. A favourable majority seemed assured, and initially was in fact present; but the atmosphere quickly changed. The 'severity' of some of the Treaty conditions, notably those of the Financial Agreement, was emphasized by Opposition orators, and the whole force of anti-Mandate sentiment was rapidly remobilized. Kurdish deputies for their own reasons withdrew from the proceedings; those of Mosul could think of nothing but the danger threatening their wilaya. The tribal shaykhs, moving in a world wholly strange to them, saw and seized the chance of bargaining their support on the Treaty issue for personal or tribal advantages. The nationalist lawyer-politicians, who soon emerged as the most convinced and active element in the Assembly, launched a campaign first of insistence upon major or indeed basic changes in the Treaty, then of vicious intimidation, and finally of actual violence; two pro-Treaty deputies were severely wounded in the streets, others threatened
664] with death. Deliberately fostered terrorism outside the Assembly building itself reached proportions beyond police control, and necessitated the presence of troops to maintain order.

648* The constant efforts of the High Commissioner were devoted, with little success, to exposition of the basic nature of the Treaty and the facts of 'Iraq's situation. He pointed out Great Britain's accepted obligations to the League, and gave assurances of later modification of the Treaty in 'Iraq's favour. A score of interviews between the High Commissioner, the King, the Prime Minister, ministers, Cornwallis, Yasin Pasha, and Opposition leaders produced no formula which could reconcile the 'Waṭanis' to ratification. Dobbs announced finally that 'Iraqi rejection of the Treaty, such as now appeared inevitable, must with all regret be reported to the League Council at its forthcoming meeting, unless ratification had occurred by 10 June; after that date Great Britain must seek means other than a friendly and generous Treaty to fulfil its mandatory functions. From this and from his refusal to bargain or to consider amendments Sir Henry was immovable. Like every preceding day, 10 June was filled with conclaves, submissions,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

It was succeeded immediately by a diluted Ikhā Ministry under Yasin Pasha, summoned to power this time, on 17 March 1935, without conditions. Destined to rule 'Iraq for twenty months, it included Rashid 'Āli Gaylani at Interior, Ja'far Pasha at Defence, Nuri at Foreign Affairs, two Shi'is—Ra'uf Baḥrani, a former Finance Inspector, at Finance, and Muḥammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, a figure in the learned and literary world, at Education—and Amin Zaki at Works. There was no representative of the left-wing group (that of the *Ahali* newspaper) under Abu al-Timman; and the omission of Ḥikmat Sulayman, to his keen resentment, was to lead later to serious results.

The tribal situation to which, from Ḥilla to Naṣiriya, the new Ministry had forthwith to address itself, was in large measure significant of the mere anti-Government lawlessness of tribes and of the patriarchal feudalism always preferred by the Shi'i leadership. As such it was a familiar 'Iraqi phenomenon from Ottoman times. But in so far as it had been produced by intrigue from Baghdad and from Najf in support of the 'political' aims of statesmen—themselves but little concerned with tribal or Shi'i advantage—it recalled the similarly evoked anti-British *Thawra* of 1920. Indeed, the history of the Euphrates in 1935 and 1936 reproduces faithfully the episodes of 1920 on a smaller but important scale. It shows again the ease with which the shaykhs were willing to follow, as they followed in 1920, any movement which seemed to offer them personal or tribal advantage—Government-appointed paramountcy in the tribe, a seat in the Chamber, a reopened land dispute, or a grant of rice-lands—with motives of no wider a patriotism than those similarly exploited by the Baghdadis fifteen years earlier.

Yasin Pasha achieved, by an air-dropped Proclamation to the tribes, a substantial immediate pacification. It was followed by visits to Baghdad by the Ikhā-favoured shaykhs. Their car-loads of festive armed followers filled the capital, with the complacent permission of the Minister of the Interior but to the alarm of onlookers. Eager for some immediate gain from their recent 'patriotic' uprisings, they mingled in street and ante-room with the Kurdish deputations from the northern liwās which, organized by the Ikhā to protest against the misdeeds of the Ayubi and Madfa'i Ministries, arrived in time to congratulate their successors. A serious episode at Kadhimiya, in which bloodshed resulted from a clash between police and a crowd demonstrating against the desecration of a graveyard, was without political meaning and could be composed without wider repercussions. The King, whose mother died in March, was acclaimed as father of a son and heir apparent—the later Faysal II—on 2 May. Parliament adjourned early in April and general elections were ordered in May.